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It is widely recognized that the fiscal decentralization that has been a key component of economic reforms in China has had a significant impact on the provision of public goods and services. Reforms have produce new inequalities, a dramatic rise in the disparity between welfare provision in rural and urban China, and an abandonment of the compact for cradleto grave social welfare for the privileged working-class. While the reforms may have raised the standard of living for the vast majority and shifted China along the road to a market economy, China's policy-makers have not been so successful in devising policies to bridge the social transition. In this respect China has fared no better than other transitional economies where economic gains have not been matched by significant improvements in welfare provision.
1 This is not surprising, as reforms entailing major institutional change are inherently slower and more complex than macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization measures. 
Financial Decentralization and the Impact on Local Governance
The reforms since 1978 have brought a progressive decline in direct state control over the economy, with powers devolved from state agencies to enterprises, a decrease in the use of mandatory planning mechanisms and a concomitant increase in the use of market forces to guide distribution and increasingly production choices. Local governments have been accorded greater control over local economic activity and the redistribution of economic rewards. However, there has been little incentive to prioritize access to healthcare. As Lu
Mai has pointed out policy has not favored investment in areas such as health as the Marxist canon did not consider them a part of the productive forces.
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Most writers have correctly pointed to the decline in central state revenue as a primary cause of the decline in the provision of public goods and services in poor areas.
However, the more important factor is the shifting balance between central and local budgetary streams and the incentive system for local officials. State revenues only amounted to 14.2 per cent of GDP in 1999, down from 36 per cent in 1978 and they had dropped as low as 11 per cent. This has severely restricted the central state's redistributive capacity and has meant that local governments have been largely left to their own devices to raise the necessary funds for development priorities. The relative decline in state revenues has created pressures at all levels and in all Chinese government agencies to meet recurrent costs from the locally generated revenues. This means that local resources and power structures determine increasingly political outcomes. Within the same province and even in adjacent counties one can see radically different socio-political outcomes deriving from the reforms. The focus on cost recovery has hampered poorer areas from providing good facilities and the capacity for richer areas to invest more in education, health and infrastructure means that the inequalities will increase further over time. For example, while a strong logic for the establishment of the elected villagers' committees might have been to enforce state policy, those in richer areas actually preside over quickly growing revenues.
Even those in poor areas have the fees they collect and, when market price is above state price for grain the differential to expend. While villagers' committees in poorer areas might be more concerned with how to raise the revenues to cover basic welfare requirements, richer villages preside over an extensive income from local enterprises and make decisions that concern village investment in road building, hospital development etc. According to John Dearlove, in the early 1990s in Fujian, committees had revenues for public expenditure that amounted to 44 per cent of total per capita village income. 28 In Guankou village Henan, the committee presides over 13 companies ranging from building materials to processing agricultural products to a 1000 head pig farm. This has enabled the committee to avoid illegal levies and fines and have one agricultural tax for all. In addition, funds cover all roadbuilding costs and it was able to build a two-story 100-bed hospital. Even in the poorer nearby Fanghsan village 350 000 yuan had been invested for road repair and relieving farmers from forced unpaid labor.
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The impact for poor rural households on health care access is particularly dramatic. Kaufman, 'Financing, Provision', p. 68. However, it is debatable whether the commune-based medical system would have survived in tact. According to Du Ying, by the mid-1970s the majority of commune and brigade-run health cooperatives had already collapsed or existed in name only. He attributes the lack of sustainability to a limited capacity to raise funds, poor financial supervision, and misuse of the system. In particular, peasants were unwilling to entrust cadres to manage their funds and many officials took advantage of the system to gain priority access for their family and friends. This resulted in a moral crisis and a breakdown in trust. Thus, he sees the main cause of the collapse as lying with the structural logic of the system rather than the economic reforms and implies that collapse would have happened in any case. Du Ying, 'Guanyu nongcun yiliao weisheng tizhi gaige de jidian kanfa' (Some Ideas on the Reform of the Rural Medical Health System), Ministry of Public Health, International Conference, pp. 36-37. 37 United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], China: Human Development Report: Human Development and Poverty Alleviation 1997 (Beijing: UNDP, 1998), p. 37. Before the communes were dismantled these cooperative medical schemes relied on yearly contributions from participants, ranging from 0.5 per cent to 2 per cent of annual income, with subsidies from collective welfare funds covering about 50 percent of the medical costs. When revived one of the first experiments was in Sichuan in 1989-90 involving 26 villages in two counties. Premiums were 1.5 per cent of average income and those insured could freely visit village and township facilities but visits to the county level were only in emergency or on referral from the township. Participation rates were high: 90 per cent with a reenrolment of 95 per cent after the first year. Administrative costs were kept low at only 8 per cent of total reimbursements. The need for some kind of catastrophic insurance was clearly shown as 11.5 per cent of the covered population used 70 per cent of total health expenditures. In poor areas for such a scheme to work, it is necessary to diversify contributions away from the household and to use the village social welfare funds, if they exist, and government allocations for poverty relief. The basic problem of healthcare delivery derives from the change of the ownership structure of village networks and the nature of the incentive system that has arisen from these changes. 39 With medical facilities there has been a growth in private medical provision and a shift away from preventive medical care to fee-for-service with local governments in is irregular or often non-existent. Essentially, they are supposed to provide a referral system to the higher levels, but rarely do anymore as most rural citizens can not afford care at higher levels. Importantly they charge a fee for their services, unless it is a specifically subsidized service, and are allowed to prescribe medicines for which they can charge. Before reviewing the survey data, two further institutional disincentives for providing good health care need to be mentioned. Where attention is paid to health both favor family planning activities over broader based healthcare and reproductive health. Beyond the need to derive revenue, the other major pressure on local officials is the political contract system and the performance contracts (gangwei mubiao zerenshu) that local governments and officials have to sign. 50 The precise nature of the contracts varies across time and place but they do set out performance expectations that provide the basis for official evaluation. Each county will set out performance contracts for the mayors and party secretaries of the townships under their jurisdiction to sign. Then contracts are signed between the towns and townships and the functional departments under their jurisdiction and then finally between the heads of these functional departments and their work personnel. Work personnel are often required to make a financial deposit when they sign their contract and this will be returned if they accomplish their tasks. 51 This weakens the capacity for comprehensive development by township governments and disfavors social development. The party and administrative organizations at the county level divides up the tasks and sets the targets for the organization and individuals at the lower levels and requires them to accomplish them within a prescribed period of time. There are usually one, three and five year contracts. The higher level makes its decision on political and economic rewards and penalties for organizations and individuals at the lower levels according to how well they have accomplished these tasks.
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The targets are divided into a mixture of priority, hard and soft targets. The priority targets are set nation-wide and usually are more political or policy oriented in nature. They would include, for example, the maintenance of social order, most recently including the eradication of the influence of Falun gong practitioners, and of course meeting the targets for family planning quotas. The hard targets concern primarily economic ones set by the county for the township and would include meeting tax revenues and meeting certain levels of growth. The soft targets tend to relate to questions of social development such as health and education provision and the concern for environmental protection. Clearly meeting the hard and priority targets are the most important as failure to meet them will mean that the rest of the work for the entire period will be discounted and there will be no promotions, titles or economic rewards distributed. It is especially important to meet the targets for family planning and failure to do so will annul good performance in other areas of work. This system produces a number of perverse outcomes and explains why officials will often pursue financing mechanism, while 28 per cent maintained a combined system under which some services were provided free while for others a fee was required.
The study was designed to look at how the macro policy changes outlined above had impacted on the delivery of reproductive health services in rural China. 57 Six major objectives were set in the survey:
• To identify reproductive health morbidity and the use of services for reproductive health problems;
• To assess the impact of fees on the use of reproductive health services;
• To identify other constraints to service utilization;
56 National Bureau of Statistics, Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 1999 (China Statistical Yearbook 1999) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1999), p.339. 57 Reproductive health services comprise a wider range of preventive and curative activities than maternal and child health. However, given the lack of equipment and trained personnel, it would be unrealistic to expect that the whole range of services would be available in a poor rural setting. As a result, a minimum set of low technology services aimed at screening for common reproductive problems of rural Chinese women are included in the definition. This comprised: the provision of contraceptive services, follow-up for contraceptive side effects, diagnosis and treatment of common reproductive tract infections (candida, trichomonas, bacterial vaginosis) and gynecological problems (prolapsed uterus and urinary fistulas), prenatal and postnatal care and delivery, and health education related to family planning, pregnancy and gynecological health.
• To assess the impact of fees on providers' time allocation and motivation to provide preventive versus curative services;
• To assess the impact of the loss of revenue to maternal and child health that accompanied the separation of family planning and health services; and
• To assess the effectiveness of certain financial mechanisms that have been instituted in several parts of China, including the maternal and child health (MCH) prepay schemes to see if they ensure coverage of preventive MCH services.
The survey used a variety of methods including household surveys of reproductive age women, interviews with providers, the collection of routine financial data and service statistics and qualitative interviews to investigate resource flows for reproductive health services, service needs and availability and user and provider constraints to optimal utilization of the services that exist. Information was collected on user needs and utilization;
pregnancy and delivery; current contraceptive use; gynecological problems and check-ups; perceived needs for services; expenditures for reproductive health and other services, attitudes toward fee-for-service financing mechanisms and willingness to pay for comprehensive service packages. Qualitative interviews were also conducted with women and local service providers, including in-depth interviews and participatory rural appraisal techniques to gather information on reproductive health beliefs and behaviors and perceived barriers to service utilization.
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The results presented here focus on three townships, two of which are in a poor county and one in a relatively better off county, albeit still extremely poor. All five enjoyed varied access to the capital city of Kunming, although it entails several hours of travel in all cases.
The poorest is Ejia Township (Shuangbei County) with a per capita income of around 325 yuan per year. Dazhuang Township, also in Shuangbei, had a per capita income of 340 yuan while the richest township was Pubei (Yimen County) with an annual per capita income of around 905 yuan. Another factor contributing to their poverty is the distance from the county town, where the county hospital and reasonable medical care is to be found. Ejia is 176 kilometers from the nearest town, while Dazhuang is 31 kilometers and Pubei is only eight kilometers away.
The survey confirmed the expected distortion in provision of services with family planning privileged over maternal and child healthcare [see Table 1 Table 2 ]. Family planning funds were increased by 1.6 per cent in Yimen and 8.9 per cent in Shuangbei over the same period.
While the financial resources are greater for the family planning system, the greater burden of care falls on MCH workers. In addition, the client burden of cost for MCH is substantial when compared with income. The government MCH resources are too limited at the township and village level, where the need is immense, and too great at the county level, where there is less need. Subsidies are being used to finance county-level MCH salaries, which are disproportionately high. The subsidies for township and village-level MCH workers are very low, creating incentives for providers to concentrate on curative care rather than on preventive care and education. In the Yunnan survey at the county MCH hospital, government budget accounted for between 37 and 45 percent of total revenue with more than 70 per cent of it going to salaries for county level MCH center doctors who serve mainly county center residents. In Shuangbai county the annual county budget for MCH remained the same from 1983 to 1985: 8000 yuan. Of this only 3000 yuan was used for the MCH system salary subsidies, an inadequate amount to fund MCH preventive work at the community level. There are also distortions in the family planning system. The contraceptive services are oriented toward 'acceptors', with very little counseling and follow-up aimed at improving client satisfaction. Therefore, while contraceptive services are provided for free, follow-up has to be paid for by the client.
This structure and the associated incentives are having a significant effect on the percentage of costs that are being generated from client fees. We have seen above how the system has generated incentives to move to fee-for-service. Government contribution to health facilities can be as low as 10 to 15 per cent, a marked contrast to other low to middle income countries where government funds make up as much as 80 per cent of support. 59 In a study of three poor counties, Gu found that in 1992 client fees accounted for over 75 per cent of revenue of county hospitals and township health centers up from 50 per cent in 1981.
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The survey did not discover such high percentages but it is clear that the percentages have risen rapidly [see Table 3 ]. They are also, not surprisingly, much higher for MCH than backache within the last six months, ruptured uterus, and vaginal tearing or prolonged labor during delivery. Women were also asked if they had observed any gynecological symptoms in the last six months. This is included as a sixth category for which data were collected. These common symptoms do not always represent a genuine medical problem but they do require assessment by a doctor to rule out potential serious medical conditions. The data show that in the poorest township, Ejia, only five per cent of women had an inhospital delivery [see Table 4 ]. The rate for delivery in hospital for Pubei was 42.55 per cent and 61.64 per cent had a modern delivery. This is not only related to proximity to a facility but also to cost and perception about the poor quality of service provision. In Ejia, a delivery in a township hospital costs approximately 200 yuan, an amount that is beyond the financial capability of the vast majority of families in poor areas. In addition, the inadequate financing of the system means that women perceive the quality of service to be poor and that local practitioners are poorly trained. They are almost certainly correct in these assumptions.
Certainly, the lack of financing means that health education has suffered in these townships, as there is no subsidy available to health workers to cover their time. This causes 45, no. 3, 1997, p. 352.
them to concentrate on revenue generating aspects of their job. This is reflected in the reasons given by women for not seeking any prenatal care [see Table 5 ]. In Ejia, almost 75
per cent of the women responded that they did not seek care either because they did not think it necessary or because they did not think that it was serious. The percentages are similar for Dazhuang (77.5 per cent) and Pubei (72.7 per cent).
The newly established MCH insurance schemes did little to improve the utilization of prenatal care and attended delivery. A review of this system in Yimen County revealed that many women who had contributed to the scheme did not realize that they were entitled to prenatal services. In addition, in some cases the scheme requires that women utilize the services at the county level, which often requires substantial amounts of travel for rural women. Under these circumstances, the funding has become a way to support salaries at the county MCH hospital that has lost its guaranteed funding under the financial reforms.
However, this use to provide salary support has come at the cost of locating the services conveniently for the rural poor, even those these women are willing to pre-pay for with the MCH insurance. Where the pre-pay scheme is located at the township level, township MCH providers whose salaries are paid by the MCH prepay schemes more actively provide prenatal and postnatal care in their nearby communities in order to meet provincial MCH targets, rather than provided badly needed outreach to more remote rural villages. Last but not least, the Yimen scheme does not provide coverage for delivery. Reluctant to pay, families frequently chose to deliver at home, especially for second births that are thought to be easier. It is noticeable that the rate for Pubei, the richest township and closest to a county town has a much higher rate of delivery at hospital than the poorer townships.
Concluding Comments
The spread not only because of local official reluctance to report cases but also because of the lack of diagnostic capacity and incentive for local officials. With infection spreading from IV drug users and sex workers to the public at large, including through contaminated blood supplies, the cost of care will overwhelm the financial capacity of local governments leaving the central state with a major dilemma of how to step in.
The Central government has now recognized that its health system is in significant distress, especially in the rural areas. The change in tone at the December 1996 National
Conference on Health was remarkable as the leadership shifted from presenting its system as a shining example to other developing countries to one of concern about its collapse. backs and other non-sanctioned revenues. The problem is that in poor areas the local government does not have the funds available to cover such a pay increase and it also has to contend with Premier Zhu Rongji's instruction to increase all local government officials' salaries. At the same time, local governments are not meant to levy more than five per cent of the annual income on the farmers under their jurisdiction. This is honored more in the breach than the observance but it does constrain the financial base of the local authorities.
Given the reality, village doctors in poor communities will remain on their own to raise income. The government has also committed itself to supporting the revival of the cooperative medical system but as noted above this has been slow in expanding and cannot be counted on any time soon.
There a number of things that could be done to improve the lot of the poor regions but without a strong constituency of support at the political center it will be very difficult.
The tension between resource spending for urban over rural health has strong historical roots and one of the underlying criticisms of Mao Zedong that launched the Cultural Revolution was of the urban bias of the health system. The most beneficial change would be to abandon the urban bias of development policy that has been a hallmark of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule since 1949. This will not happen given the strong vested interests of the CCP and the marginality of rural constituents in the policy process.
However, if the CCP could clear up the state owned enterprise sector, a prime destroyer of state assets, this could have enormous beneficial effects for rural China if part of the current subsidies were diverted to productive investment in the countryside.
More possible measures would be to integrate the family planning network with the health system at the local level. This would have the effect of restoring funding to the impoverished MCH system. This revived funding stream could help subsidize related service such as gynecological care and follow-up for contraceptive side effects and problems. This topic has been the subject of much discussion and debate in recent years, was hotly debated at the recent conference on Health Reform and Development, and has been identified as one for further immediate policy analysis and discussion through the newly launched China Health Development Forum. 65 China has been moving in the opposite direction to most of the world that has sought to integrate better health services. However, China's engagement in international health discussions and its acceptance of the international reproductive health agenda has caused some to realize that this fragmentation may not be beneficial.
Finally, rural reproductive healthcare provision appears to be a clear case where the 'public goods' argument applies. The central government needs to tighten the regulatory framework to ensure that guidelines on health are followed and that in poor areas better provision needs to be provided at central government expense. The Central government would be well served to be the provider and supporter of public health, ensuring more equitable access, rather than focusing its efforts on subsidizing the salaries of those in the health system. 
